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Abstract 
Drawing upon the work of Pierre Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant, this paper argues that the demise of the Keynesian Wel-
fare State (KWS) and the rise of neo-liberal economic policies in the UK has placed new surveillance technologies at the 
centre of a reconfigured “crime control field” (Garland, 2001) designed to control the problem populations created by 
neo-liberal economic policies (Wacquant, 2009a). The paper also suggests that field theory could be usefully deployed 
in future research to explore how wider global trends or social forces, such as neo-liberalism or bio-power, are refract-
ed through the crime control field in different national jurisdictions. We conclude by showing how this approach pro-
vides a bridge between society-wide analysis and micro-sociology by exploring how the operation of new surveillance 
technologies is mediated by the “habitus” of surveillance agents working in the crime control field and contested by 
surveillance subjects. 
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1. Introduction 
Surveillance, defined as the “collection and analysis of 
information about populations in order to govern their 
activities” (Haggerty & Ericson, 2006, p. 3), has always 
been a central feature of policing and criminal justice. 
This includes the “direct supervision” of subject popu-
lations in prisons and probation work and the accumu-
lation of “coded information” (Giddens, 1985) which 
began in the nineteenth century when fingerprints, 
photographs and files were collated by criminal justice 
practitioners. Over the last two decades however the 
advent of computer databases, surveillance cameras 
and other technological advances are said to have giv-
en rise to a “new surveillance”1 (Marx, 2002) compris-
ing of “surveillant assemblages” (Haggerty & Ericson, 
2000) which operate well beyond the confines of the 
central state. In an attempt to make sense of these de-
                                                          
1 For Gary T. Marx (2002, p. 12), new surveillance refers to “the 
use of technical means to extract or create personal data”. 
velopments, the theoretical literature has been domi-
nated by Foucaultian and Deleuzian-inspired perspec-
tives on “discipline” (Foucault, 1977) and “control” 
(Deleuze, 1992). As Lyon (1993, p. 655) points out, for 
many writers “the idea of exploiting uncertainty in the 
observed as a way of ensuring their subordination has 
obvious resonance with current electronic technologies 
that permit highly unobtrusive monitoring of data sub-
jects in a variety of social contexts”. For other writers, 
the disciplinary model of surveillance eventually 
proved too inflexible “to organize the mobile labour 
forces and financial flows of complex information 
economies” (Bogard, 2012, p. 33). Thus, while for some 
writers the emergence of new surveillance technologies 
is consistent with the “disciplinary power” and “self-
governing capabilities” identified by Foucault (Staples & 
Decker, 2008), for others disciplinary power has been 
replaced with “modulation” which works through mod-
els, simulation, codes, statistical tracking, and new 
methods of social sorting (Bogard, 2012, pp. 32-33).  
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The central argument presented here is that the 
Focuaultian and Deleuzian-inspired literature outlined 
above does not adequately address the politics of sur-
veillance by explaining why or how new surveillance 
technologies have come to play such a central role in 
contemporary society and in particular how they have 
become central to policing and criminal justice. As 
Haggerty (2006, p. 34) points out, in the Foucualtian 
literature, “the movement of panoptic principles into 
new settings” is “often presented as entirely friction-
less” and lacking any “sense of a surveillance politics”. 
Similarly, Deleuzian-inspired accounts of the emer-
gence of networked and flexible forms of control in re-
sponse to the global system of capital (Bogard, 2006) 
operate at a very high level of abstraction and conse-
quently fail to explore how wider global trends or so-
cial forces, such as neo-liberalism or bio-power, are re-
fracted through the crime control field in different 
national jurisdictions. To address these questions, we 
situate the emergence of new surveillance technolo-
gies within “fields of struggle”, defined by Bourdieu “as 
a structured space of positions in which the positions 
and their interrelations are determined by the distribu-
tion of different kinds of resources or “capital” 
(Thompson, 1991, p. 14). We begin at the macro level 
by showing how globalizing forces and wider social 
changes are filtered through the “field of power”2 in 
different national jurisdictions. Next, we argue that the 
demise of the Keynesian Welfare State (KWS) and the 
rise of neo-liberal economic policies in the UK has 
placed new surveillance technologies at the centre of a 
reconfigured “crime control field” (Garland, 2001) de-
signed to control the problem populations created by 
neo-liberal economic policies (Wacquant, 2009a). Final-
ly, we show how field theory provides a bridge be-
tween society-wide analysis and micro-sociology by 
showing how the operation of new surveillance tech-
nologies is mediated by the “habitus”3 of surveillance 
agents and surveillance subjects. But first we explain 
how and why we intend to use this approach to make 
sense of contemporary developments.  
2. Why “Field” Theory?  
In an early paper entitled, “The Genesis of the Bureau-
cratic Field”, Pierre Bourdieu (1984) extends Max We-
ber’s definition of the state as an institution “which 
possesses a monopoly over the legitimate use of (phys-
ical) violence”, by adding that the bureaucratic field 
“also monopolizes the use of ‘symbolic violence’” (Ben-
                                                          
2 The “field of power” refers to “the upper reaches of the social 
class structure where individuals and groups bring considerable 
amounts of various kinds of capital into their struggles for 
power” (Swartz, 2004, p. 12). 
3 Habitus refers to the “set of dispositions which incline agents 
to act and react in certain ways” (Thompson, 1991, p. 12). 
son, 2005, p. 93). For Bourdieu, symbolic violence is 
the power to “constitute the given” (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 
170) and refers to the state’s “ability to make appear 
as natural, inevitable, and thus apolitical, that which is 
a product of historical struggle and human invention” 
(Loveman, 2005, p. 1655). From this perspective, the 
development of bureaucratic administration and the 
use of “civil registration and related forms of state 
identification of individuals are at the core of modern 
states’ capacity to exercise symbolic power” (Loveman, 
2005, p. 1679). In this respect, Bourdieu’s early paper 
on the state complements the work of other social 
theorists who have documented how surveillance orig-
inally emerged in the context of state bureaucracy, po-
licing and government administration (Dandeker, 1990; 
Lyon, 1994). However, while Bourdieu used field theory 
to explore a wide-range of semi-autonomous and in-
creasingly specialized spheres of action, such as the 
fields of politics, religion, and cultural production, he 
did not write about the “crime control field” (Garland, 
2001) which makes up a key component of the “right 
hand of the state” (Wacquant, 2009a, p. 289; see also 
Page, 2013), nor did he have anything to say about the 
emergence of a “surveillance society” which has seen 
surveillance proliferate well beyond the bureaucratic 
field to become a routine and mundane feature that is 
“embedded in every aspect of life” (Lyon, 2001, p. 1). 
In recent years however a number of writers have used 
field theory to analyse penal transformation in the age 
of neo-liberalism. Didier Bigo (2000, 2002), for exam-
ple, has outlined the emergence of a transnational field 
of security professionals across the European Union in-
volved in the “management of unease” (Bigo, 2002, p. 
64). This approach has also been used by Dupont 
(2004, p. 85) who draws upon Bourdieu’s notion of 
“capitals” (economic, social, cultural and symbolic) to 
explore how these resources can be “used as strategic 
assets to acquire or maintain a dominant position with-
in security networks”. Garland (2001) meanwhile com-
bines “field” theory with “governmentality” (Foucault, 
1991) to argue that recent transformations in policing, 
punishment, sentencing and crime prevention “can 
best be grasped by viewing them as interactive ele-
ments in a structured field of crime control and crimi-
nal justice” (Garland, 2001, p. x). Finally, Wacquant 
(2009) has drawn upon Bourdieu’s distinction between 
the “left hand” of the state (e.g. education, health, so-
cial assistance) and the “right hand” of the state (e.g. 
police, justice, and correctional administrations) (Bour-
dieu, 1998, p. 2) to examine the fusion of penal policy 
and welfare policy to manage the problem populations 
generated by neo-liberal economic policies.  
One of the recurring criticisms levelled at Bour-
dieu’s writings on the “bureaucratic field” is that he 
tends to generalise from the case of the (strong and 
centralised) French state and consequently “fails to 
speak to those in the Anglophone world who have ex-
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perienced over thirty years of the rolling back of the 
state by neo-liberal governments” (A. Scott, 2013, p. 
65). From this perspective, notions of “nodal govern-
ance” (Johnston & Shearing, 2003) or “governmentali-
ty” (Foucault, 1991) are much more suitable for theo-
rizing the emergence of “surveillant assemblages” 
(Haggerty & Ericson, 2000) which operate beyond the 
confines of the bureaucratic field. However, following 
A. Scott (2013), we argue that it possible to use Bour-
dieu’s parochialism (regarding his generalisation from 
the “strong” French state) to counter our own (Anglo-
phone) parochialism regarding the “weak” neo-liberal 
state (A. Scott, 2013). In this respect, Bourdieu’s writ-
ings on the bureaucratic field provide a means of criti-
cally engaging with the Foucualtian and Deleuzian lit-
erature which underestimates how neo-liberal 
strategies of privatization can serve to strengthen the 
position of political elites (A. Scott, 2013). From this 
perspective, law and order campaigns and the intro-
duction of new laws and surveillance measures “reas-
sert the authority of the state and shore up the deficit 
of legitimacy officials suffer when they abandon the 
mission of social and economic protection established 
during the Fordist-Keynesian era” (Wacquant, 2010, p. 
198). At the same time, this approach avoids economic 
reductionism or conspiracy theory4, focusing instead 
on how social fields emerge as the result of on-going 
struggles between actors whose aim is to set “the rules 
that govern the different social games (fields) and, in 
particular, the rules of reproduction of these games” 
(Wacquant, 1993, p. 42).  
The use of field theory outlined above we argue 
provides a useful theoretical framework for examining 
the politics of surveillance in the UK crime control field. 
However, there are two caveats to our use of this ap-
proach to theorize current surveillance practice. Firstly, 
while much of the criminological literature has focused 
on state surveillance and policing, this is too restrictive 
for an analysis of the new surveillance which increas-
ingly operates across state and non-state institutions. 
To avoid this limitation we use Garland’s (2001) broad-
er definition of the “crime control field”. This includes 
“the formal controls exercised by the state’s criminal 
justice agencies and the informal social controls that 
are embedded in everyday activities and interactions in 
civil society” (2001, p. 5). This more expansive concep-
tion of the crime control field allows us to examine the 
social impact of new surveillance in both the penal sec-
tor of the bureaucratic field (e.g. prisons, probation 
and policing) and in the wider society which has seen 
                                                          
4 As Bigo (2000) has argued in the context of the emergence of 
a European security field, “there is no cabal—be it based within 
a faction of politicians, or of police officials, or both—
conspiring to undermine civil liberties and increase the powers 
of police agencies. Rather, a field has emerged which is the re-
sult of on-going struggles between actors” (Bigo, 2000, p. 90).  
new surveillance measures introduced in schools, uni-
versities, shopping malls, airports etc. (Simon, 2007). 
Secondly, the question of how those on the receiving 
end of surveillance experience and respond to being 
monitored has received relatively little attention (alt-
hough see Marx, 2003). For instance, in his account of 
how penal sanction and welfare supervision have 
merged “into a single apparatus for the cultural cap-
ture and behavioural control of marginal populations”, 
Wacquant (2009a, p. xix) explains how his approach 
“does not survey efforts to resist, divest, or divert the 
imprint of the penal state from below”. To address this 
issue we draw upon recent ethnographic research de-
signed to explore how a diverse range of groups expe-
rience and respond to being monitored by the new 
surveillance technologies that are currently used in the 
crime control field (McCahill & Finn, 2014). We situate 
the emergence of surveillance within “fields of strug-
gle”, arguing that the distribution of various forms of 
“capital”—economic, social, cultural and symbolic—
operate as a range of goods or resources that structure 
the dynamics of surveillance practices and power rela-
tions in the crime control field. By doing this we also 
extend Bourdieu’s conceptual toolkit by introducing 
the term surveillance capital to illustrate how surveil-
lance subjects utilise everyday forms of cultural know-
how acquired through first-hand experience of power 
relations to challenge the very same power relations. 
However, before we examine the micro-politics of re-
sistance, we need to situate the emergence of new 
surveillance in a wider political context.  
3. The Global Diffusion of Surveillance—The Case of 
CCTV Surveillance Cameras 
As Murakami Wood (2009, p. 181) has argued, general-
ised descriptions of a surveillance society often under-
play the “immense cultural and geographic variety of 
surveillance societies” (emphasis added). Bourdieu’s 
work is useful here because he “explodes the vacuous 
notion of ‘society’ and replaces it with those of field 
and social space”. For Bourdieu, “fields of struggle” are 
relatively autonomous social spaces “that cannot be 
collapsed under an overall societal logic” (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992, p. 17) such as “modernity” or “post-
modernity”, or, we might add, the “surveillance socie-
ty”. Globalizing forces and wider social change, for ex-
ample, are always filtered through the political and ju-
ridical fields of different national jurisdictions. 
Comparative work conducted by criminologists on the 
uneven global diffusion of the “new punitiveness 5 may 
                                                          
5 As Nelken (2005, pp. 220-221) points out, while new surveil-
lance “cannot be classified as ‘stigmatizing punish-
ments’…there would be a strong argument for taking them in-
to account in terms of the way they tend to replace 
expenditure on more “social” forms of prevention, and the 
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be useful here for exploring the diffusion of new sur-
veillance. For instance, in their comparative study of 
criminal justice in twelve different countries, Cavadino 
and Dignan (2006) constructed a typology of political 
economy which showed major differences between 
neo-liberal (USA, South Africa, England and Wales, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand), conservative-corporatist (Germa-
ny, France, Italy, and the Netherlands), social demo-
cratic (Sweden and Finland), and oriental-corporatist 
countries (Japan). In short, they found that neo-liberal 
countries were more punitive (exhibiting higher prison 
rates, lower age of criminal responsibility, and adop-
tion of privatization policies), followed by conservative 
corporatist, social democratic and oriental corporatist 
(in Lacey, 2008, pp. 44-45). These findings have been 
supported by Lacey (2008) in her “comparative institu-
tional analysis” which showed that Liberal Market 
Economies (LMEs) (especially the UK and USA) adopted 
more exclusionary criminal justice systems than Coor-
dinated Market Economies (CMEs) (north-western Eu-
rope, Scandinavia and Japan).  
Any attempt to address similar questions in relation 
to the global diffusion of new surveillance would re-
quire systematic comparative research. However, there 
are one or two studies that allow us to raise some ten-
tative questions or hypotheses that may guide future 
research. For instance, while research conducted on 
the rise of CCTV surveillance in Europe by the Ur-
baneye project found a general diffusion of surveil-
lance cameras throughout European society, the 
growth of these systems in countries such as Germany 
and Norway was restricted due to the contrasting legal 
and constitutional environments of the juridical fields 
(see Norris, McCahill, & Murakami Wood, 2004, p. 
121). Thus, while the legal context in the UK is ex-
tremely permissive, privacy rights in CMEs such as 
Denmark and Norway are constitutionally enshrined. 
The latter also have strong data protection regimes to 
regulate the introduction and use of new surveillance 
measures such as CCTV surveillance cameras (see Nor-
ris et al., 2004, p. 121). The uneven proliferation of 
“new surveillance” must also be situated in a wider so-
cio-economic context. Thus, whereas CMEs are “prem-
ised on incorporation” and “the need to reintegrate of-
fenders onto society and economy”, LMEs are based on 
flexibility and innovation which means that “under 
conditions of surplus unskilled labour…the costs of a 
harsh, exclusionary criminal justice system are less 
than they would be in a co-ordinated market econo-
my” (Lacey, 2008, p. 59). It is no surprise therefore to 
discover that the diffusion of CCTV surveillance in Eu-
rope has been more widespread in countries undergo-
ing economic dislocation or liberalisation, such as Hun-
gary and the UK, than it has been in “countries which 
have had relatively, stable welfarist-orientated gov-
                                                                                           
types of exclusionary messages they send to the collectivity”. 
ernments such as Norway, Sweden, Germany and Aus-
tria” (Norris et al., 2004, p. 121). These findings are 
supported by more recent research on the global diffu-
sion of open-street CCTV surveillance cameras in Brazil 
(Murakami Wood, 2012), Turkey (Bozbeyoglu, 2012) 
and South Africa (Minnaar, 2012) which reflect a 
broader shift in these countries away from socially pro-
gressive polices and welfare, towards exclusionary 
measures directed at marginalised populations. The 
degree of central funding committed by the state is 
another key factor in the global diffusion of new sur-
veillance. As Wacquant (2010, p. 214) points out, while 
the neoliberal state “embraces laissez-faire at the top”, 
it tends to “be fiercely interventionist, bossy, and 
pricey” when introducing new measures to control 
problem populations. Thus, between 1992 and 2002 
the UK central government, through its City Challenge 
Competition and Crime Reduction Programmes, com-
mitted over a quarter of a Billion pounds of predomi-
nantly public money to the expansion of CCTV surveil-
lance cameras (Norris et al., 2004, p. 112). As Doyle, 
Lippert and Lyon (2012, p. 6) point out, “the absence of 
similar driving initiatives by national governments is one 
factor explaining the much slower dissemination of pub-
lic open-street camera surveillance in other” countries6.  
4. The Politics of Surveillance in the UK: Managing 
Problem Populations  
As indicated above, the legitimating factors behind the 
growth of new surveillance technologies include tech-
nological potential, the rise of the personal-
information economy, risk management, national secu-
rity, public perceptions, new laws and neoliberalism 
(Bennett, Haggerty, Lyon, & Steeves, 2014, pp. 10-13). 
In their outline of the key drivers behind surveillance, 
Bennett et al. (2014, p. 11) define neo-liberalism as a 
set of “governmental policies that stress free trade and 
deregulated markets”. However, as Wacquant (2009a, 
2010) points out, neo-liberal policies include not only a 
preference for market rule, but also “an expansive and 
proactive penal apparatus”, “welfare state devolution 
and retraction”, and “the cultural trope of individual 
responsibility” (Wacquant, 2010, p. 197). While 
Wacquant used this framework to examine penal 
transformation in the USA, this broader sociological 
conception of “neo-liberalism” provides a useful con-
ceptual framework for theorizing the emergence of 
new surveillance technologies in the UK crime control 
field. As we shall show below, the emergence of an ex-
pansive penal apparatus, welfare state retraction, and 
neo-liberal responsibilisation strategies are all central 
                                                          
6 As Smith (2015) points out, the neoliberal concern with eco-
nomic rationalism could eventually lead to a shift from the pol-
itics of surveillance “expansion” to a politics of “diminution” as 
large-scale CCTV networks become a financial burden. 
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drivers behind the emergence of new surveillance 
technologies in the crime control field.  
Any theory of contemporary penal change must 
begin by considering the wider transformation of the 
“field of power” ushered in by the demise of the 
Keynesian Welfare State (KWS) and the emergence of 
neo-liberalism. As a number of writers have argued, 
this transformation has resulted in the deautonomiza-
tion of the crime control field whereby the cultural 
capital of criminological and legal experts has become 
de-valued or de-legitimated, while political capital (in 
relation to crime control) has become valorised7. As 
Haggerty (2004) points out, while criminal justice policy 
(in the USA and UK) has always been driven by political 
considerations, the last two decades have seen the 
emergence of a more explicitly symbolic politics which 
values political expediency above criminological re-
search and the emergence of a technological field of 
expertise which has served to “displace the policy rele-
vance of criminology” (2004, p. 222). Following the IRA 
bombings in the City of London in 1993, for example, a 
network of CCTV surveillance cameras was rapidly in-
troduced to record traffic movement in and out of the 
city centre. Similar developments were reported after 
the attacks on September 11 in the United States when 
the “rush to surveillance” intensified further largely 
driven by developments in the political and journalistic 
fields (Ball & Webster, 2003). In this context, the intro-
duction of new legislation or new surveillance technol-
ogies such as CCTV cameras is often announced at a 
political party conference or in the “journalistic field” 
before any systematic evaluation of their efficacy (see 
Norris, 2012, p. 254).  
As Garland (2001) points out, the developments 
outlined above are also related to the demise of penal 
modernism which has witnessed the emergence of pu-
nitive law enforcement policies alongside risk-based 
strategies of social control. For Garland (2001, pp. 105-
106), these developments are the result of “a new 
criminological predicament…the normality of high 
crime rates and the acknowledged limitations of the 
criminal justice state”. The response to this predica-
ment in the “crime control field” has resulted in a se-
ries of policies that are highly contradictory. Garland 
notes that on the one hand the state appears to be at-
tempting to reclaim the power of sovereign command 
by the use of phrases like “zero tolerance”, “prison 
works”, and “three strikes”. However, at the same time 
there has been an attempt to face up to the predica-
ment and develop new pragmatic “adaptive” strategies 
including the “commercialization of justice” and a re-
distribution of the responsibility for crime control 
(2001, p. 113). While Garland (2001) sees these devel-
                                                          
7 The exception here of course is the influence of “new right” 
criminologists such as James Q. Wilson which chimes with neo-
liberal thinking (see Haggerty, 2004).  
opments as a schizoid and disjointed response from 
the state to a new “criminological predicament”, 
Wacquant (2009a, p. 301) argues that it is “a predicta-
ble organizational division in the labour of manage-
ment of the disruptive poor”. From this perspective, 
the rapid introduction of “new surveillance” technolo-
gies following highly mediatised crimes fits neatly with 
the “sovereign state” strategies of “denial” and “acting 
out” (Garland, 2001) that are manifest in the “political” 
and “journalistic” fields, while the emergence of actu-
arial regimes characterised by pre-emption, surveil-
lance and intelligence-led policing chimes with the 
“adaptive strategies” (Garland, 2001) found in the pe-
nal sector of the “bureaucratic field”.  
As a number of writers have shown, the new sur-
veillance practices and technologies that have been in-
troduced in the UK are disproportionately directed to-
wards those shorn of economic and cultural capital. In 
recent years, for example, probation policy in the UK 
has seen the widespread use of standardized assess-
ment tools that are used to classify and “separate the 
more from the less dangerous” (Feeley & Simon, 1992, 
p. 452). These developments have facilitated the intro-
duction of intensive supervision and surveillance pro-
grammes directed at “prolific” or “persistent” offend-
ers which utilise compulsory drug testing, criminal 
profiling, electronic monitoring and police databases. 
As Norris (2007, p. 156) has shown, the construction of 
this expansive surveillance apparatus in the bureau-
cratic field is used to monitor those shorn of capital, 
typically “an unemployed, drug-using male, under the 
age of 21, who is likely to have been in local authority 
care, been excluded from school and have few, if any, 
qualifications”. Similar developments can be found in 
the context of “bureaucratic welfare” regimes where a 
plethora of new surveillance technologies have been 
introduced to monitor the welfare poor (Gilliom, 2001; 
Wacquant, 2009a). Welfare claimants in the UK and 
USA are surrounded by a range of surveillance technol-
ogies and programmes that intimately oversee their el-
igibility for work, leisure patterns and family status. In 
the United States, for instance, it has become increas-
ingly difficult to distinguish the welfare office from the 
probation office:  
Welfare offices have borrowed the stock-and-trade 
techniques of the correctional institution: a behav-
iourist philosophy of action a` la Skinner, constant 
close-up monitoring, strict spatial assignments and 
time constraints, intensive record-keeping and case 
management, periodic interrogation and reporting, 
and a rigid system of graduated sanctions for failing 
to perform properly (Wacquant, 2009a, p. 102).  
The other central feature of neo-liberal regimes identi-
fied by Wacquant (2010) is the cultural trope of indi-
vidual responsibility. In the crime control field, this in-
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volves an attempt by the state to devolve the respon-
sibility for surveillance onto individuals and organisa-
tions. For instance, over the last two decades the CCTV 
Challenge Competitions and Crime Reduction Pro-
grammes devolved the responsibility for crime control 
in the UK on to local public-private partnerships. 
Moreover, empirical research in UK town centres has 
shown how these public-private CCTV systems can be 
co-opted for central state purposes and used to target 
“known criminals”, “suspected drug addicts”, and those 
“wanted” for the breach of bail conditions (Coleman, 
2004; McCahill, 2002; Wakefield, 2003). More recent ex-
amples of responsibilisation include the Anti Money 
Laundering/Counter Terrorism Financing (AML/CFT) and 
e-Borders surveillance regimes (Ball et al., 2015). The 
former requires banks and building societies to monitor 
customer transactions and report any suspicious activi-
ty to the Serious Organized Crime Agency, while the 
latter requires airlines to collect passport data in ad-
vance of travel and transfer it to the UK Border Agency 
for screening against watch-lists (Ball et al., 2015, p. 
21). Once again these surveillance regimes do not fall 
equally on all populations as customer activities and fi-
nancial transactions are incorporated into information 
infrastructures which support the identification of 
criminals and terrorists (Ball et al., 2015).  
5. Surveillance Practice: “Habitus” and “Field” 
As Ball et al. (2015) have argued, surveillance theorists 
have tended to provide either society-wide analysis of 
the emergence of a surveillance society, or micro-
sociological accounts of local dynamics and resistance. 
However, the nature of the connection between the 
two levels of analysis “has not been theorised in sur-
veillance studies in a thoroughgoing way” (2015, p. 25). 
The work of Bourdieu may be instructive here as his 
entire approach to sociology was partly an attempt to 
develop a new direction in social theory that would 
steer a course between what he considered the exces-
sive “voluntarism” of the philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre 
and the excessive “structuralism” of the anthropologist 
Levi-Strauss. What must be explained, according to 
Bourdieu, “is always choice within a structured situa-
tion that individuals do not themselves consciously 
structure” (in Couzens Hoy, 2005, p. 119). From this 
perspective, the actions and choices of individuals are 
shaped by “the internalization of the objective patterns 
of their extant social environment” (Wacquant, 2005, 
p. 137) and by the position they occupy in any given 
field. In an attempt to apply this approach to the study 
of penality, Joshua Page (2013) has argued that ab-
stract theoretical accounts of penal transformation of-
ten fail to consider the intervening mechanisms that 
translate social-structural phenomena into penal prac-
tice. From this perspective, macro-level social trans-
formations are always retranslated into the internal 
logic of “fields” and mediated by a field-specific “habi-
tus” which refers to “an internal set of dispositions that 
shape perception, appreciation, and action” (Page, 2013, 
p. 152)8. Thus, while “macro-level, structural trends af-
fect practice (what agents do and what decisions are 
made)…they do not do so automatically and without 
mediation” (2013, p. 154). Similar arguments can be 
made in relation to the crime control field. For instance, 
empirical research on “surveillance practice” in a range 
of settings has shown that despite the decline of the pe-
nal welfare model, those working within the “left hand” 
of the state have often opposed the measures intro-
duced by the “right hand” of the state (Bourdieu, 1998, 
p. 2). In Australia, for example, practitioners working 
within “welfarist” working cultures obstructed the intro-
duction of public-space surveillance cameras (Sutton & 
Wilson, 2004). Similarly, research has shown how “wel-
fare agency staff assisted clients in bettering the surveil-
lance system” through the use of “head nods (yes) or 
shakes (no) as the client responded to questions during 
intake interviews that were logging data into the sys-
tem” (Gilliom & Monahan, 2012, p. 408). At the micro-
level of probation practice, meanwhile, it has been 
shown that the “Right hand” of the state is not always 
aware of what the “Left hand” is doing as “risk-based” 
discourses are filtered through the occupational con-
cerns of front-line practitioners who continue to be 
guided by the old “welfare” mentality rather than the 
“risk” mentality (Kemshall & Maguire, 2001).  
As the neo-liberal state attempts to devolve the re-
sponsibility for crime control, new surveillance agents 
have entered the crime control field bringing with 
them a “habitus” that shapes the way new surveillance 
technologies are applied in practice. For instance, em-
pirical research on the use of CCTV surveillance camer-
as in a shopping mall in Riyadh found that surveillance 
monitoring was filtered through the religious norms 
and social mores of those operating the systems. In this 
context, private security officers who recently left their 
tribal village used cameras not to target groups of 
“flawed consumers”, but to target “singles”, groups of 
males suspected of engaging in “courtship” behaviour 
in a sex-segregated society (Al-hadar & McCahill, 
2011). In the UK, ethnographic research on the opera-
tion of CCTV systems on mass private property has 
shown how some corporate actors continue to work 
with the old “welfare” mentality, empathising with the 
plight of local working class youths (McCahill, 2002). 
One study on the use of CCTV surveillance cameras in a 
shopping mall situated on a deprived council estate in 
the north of England, reported how low paid, low sta-
tus, working class security officers refused to pass on 
the names of “wanted” persons identified on camera 
                                                          
8 The difference between “habitus” and “field” was character-
ised by Bourdieu “as the difference between the feel for the 
game and the game itself” (Couzens Hoy, 2005, p. 110). 
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to the local beat officer (McCahill, 2002). More recent-
ly, ethnographic observations of encounters between 
“flawed consumers” and private security officers in an 
English shopping mall revealed that despite receiving 
“life-time” banning orders, marginalized groups utilised 
social capital (i.e. collusion with private security offic-
ers) to gain access to public services that were provid-
ed on private property (McCahill & Finn, 2014). Thus, 
while the crime control field may have changed dra-
matically in recent years “neither the ‘culture of con-
trol’ nor the ‘new penology’ have fully taken root in the 
heads and habitus of penal agents” (Page, 2013, p. 
158), or in the heads of “private” actors who often find 
themselves monitoring their own locales and work-
place situations (McCahill, 2002)9.   
6. Surveillance, Capital and Resistance 
One of Bourdieu’s central contributions to social theory 
was to demonstrate that it is not only “economic capi-
tal” (i.e. money or property) that functions as a deter-
minant of social position, but also “social capital” in the 
form of networks and social relationships, “cultural 
capital” such as education, skills and cultural 
knowledge, and “symbolic capital” which designates 
the authority, knowledge, prestige, or reputation that 
an individual or group has accumulated (Bourdieu, 
1986). While previous research has shown how these 
forms of capital can be mobilised by the institutional 
actors conducting surveillance (Dupont, 2004, p. 244), 
this section draws upon ethnographic research to show 
how the subjective experience and response to surveil-
lance is also shaped by the distribution of capitals (see 
McCahill & Finn, 2014). For instance, our research has 
shown that relatively privileged groups, such as “mid-
dle class” protesters or police officers, utilised econom-
ic, social and cultural capital to evade or contest sur-
veillance in various ways. Protesters utilised social 
capital (e.g. personal contacts with senior police offic-
ers, lawyers, MPs, local councillors, journalists, and as-
sociates working in the “privacy” movement) and cul-
tural capital (e.g. knowledge of the law) to challenge 
surveillance through the courts, or to discover the “fate 
of their data” through Freedom of Information re-
quests. Similarly, police officers and security officers 
working under the gaze of CCTV surveillance cameras 
utilised social and cultural capital to manage not just 
when they appeared on CCTV, but also how they ap-
peared on camera. In this case, knowledge of either 
operating the systems or visiting control rooms, ena-
                                                          
9 Research on the Anti Money Laundering/Counter Terrorism 
Financing (AML/CFT) and e-Borders regime has shown how na-
tional security surveillance regimes were filtered through the 
“habitus” of corporate actors who used e-Borders to explore 
commercial opportunities arising from the extra customer con-
tact (Ball et al., 2015).  
bled plural police actors to avoid the gaze of surveil-
lance camera operators by locating themselves in 
“blind spots” when patrolling the shopping malls or 
streets. Alternatively, plural police actors would visit 
surveillance camera control rooms to review footage, 
reflect on their bodily comportment, and modify their 
behaviour in future “face-to-face” interactions (McCa-
hill & Finn, 2014).  
However, it is not only relatively privileged groups 
who utilise capitals to contest surveillance in various 
ways. As Bennett et al. (2010, p. 29) have suggested, 
“rather than assume an essential unity to cultural capi-
tal”, it may be useful to explore how other forms of 
cultural know-how may serve to function “as sources 
of cultural privilege” in a range of new settings and sit-
uations. For instance, in his later work Bourdieu (2005) 
used the concept of “technical capital” “to refer to the 
distinctive assets that members of the working classes 
acquire through their vocational skills and pass on to 
their children through domestic training” (in Bennett et 
al., 2010, p. 29). Bourdieu (1990) also referred to the 
“lucidity of the excluded” to illustrate how the exclu-
sion of marginalised groups from certain realms of priv-
ilege can often accord them a certain critical insight in-
to the structures that oppress them (see McNay, 2000). 
Thus, alongside the “master” concepts of capital identi-
fied by Bourdieu, we have introduced the term surveil-
lance capital to explain how surveillance subjects uti-
lise the everyday forms of tacit knowledge that is 
acquired through first-hand experience of power rela-
tions to challenge the very same power relations. For 
instance, our ethnographic research showed how “pro-
lific” offenders were aware that probation officers 
shared information with other agencies because of 
what they had read on the induction forms that they 
were required to sign. Others were aware that any in-
formation they might give away during interviews was 
likely to be stored on the database. One prolific of-
fender summed it up when he said: 
Like the police that work with me make out that 
they’re not the police and they work with probation 
and that, but they’re full on undercover coppers. 
The quicker you get to learn that the better innit? 
You don’t want to be an idiot and pretend that 
they’re not proper police (in McCahill & Finn, 2014).  
Moreover, while the information stored on databases 
can be treated as the source of “truth” that overrides 
personal testimonies, some “prolific” offenders used 
the existence of the “file” or “database” to avoid 
“opening up” and answering questions during face-to-
face interviews by telling drugs workers in the proba-
tion office to “go check the file”. “Prolific” offenders al-
so used the existence of “new technologies” to evade 
monitoring by keeping text messages sent by the pro-
bation staff to prove that they had not missed or were 
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not late for appointments. One “prolific” offender used 
the data that had been extracted from his body to his 
advantage when he requested photo-copies of any 
“negative” drug tests to take home and show his part-
ner that he was not using drugs. Family members of 
“prolific” offenders also used surveillance against sur-
veillance to support their case when confronted by the 
police. One mother kept fragments of her son’s “digital 
persona” (electronically-recorded consumer transac-
tions) to challenge police decisions to question or ar-
rest her son. While surveillance capital may not be 
easily translated into other forms of “capital”, it does 
provide surveillance subjects with a degree of agency 
in local and specific settings.  
As Bourdieu argued, while “those who dominate in 
a given field are in a position to make it function to 
their advantage…they must always contend with the 
resistance, the claims, the contention…of the dominat-
ed” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 102). However, 
the French author was also well aware of the ironies of 
resistance and the potential for these strategies to re-
produce existing social divisions. In an attempt to con-
ceptualize these issues, he used “the term ‘regulated 
liberties’ to denote a more complex relation between 
the dominant and its subjects” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 
102). Here Bourdieu (1990) drew attention to what he 
described as “the unresolvable contradiction of re-
sistance”, whereby the dominated “can resist by trying 
to efface the signs of difference that have led to their 
domination”, or they can “dominate their own domina-
tion by accepting and accentuating the characteristics 
that mark them as dominated” (in Couzens Hoy, 2005, 
p. 135). In recent years, a number of writers have 
drawn upon these ideas to explore the relationship be-
tween surveillance, body capital and class divisions fol-
lowing the shift from an industrial society organised 
around manufacturing and heavy industry to a post-
industrial society dominated by the service sector and 
consumerism. In the field of employment the decline of 
heavy industry which valued a “type of ‘body capital’ 
forged through notions of physical hardness and a pa-
triarchal breadwinner”, now seems out of step in a 
consumer or service economy “that values flexibility, 
keyboard proficiency, telephone communication skills 
and personal presentation” (Nayak, 2006, p. 817). The 
exclusion of working class males from the field of em-
ployment in post-industrial cities is compounded by 
exclusion from public spaces due to embodied attrib-
utes which are considered “out of place” in the new 
spaces of consumption. Nayak (2006, p. 821) for exam-
ple has shown how the “body capital” of young work-
ing males in Newcastle led to their exclusion from clubs 
and bars in the city centre. He refers to how so-called 
“charvers” “hold their head” and “arch their backs 
when walking”. The targeting practices of open-street 
CCTV operators in UK cities are also said to fall dispro-
portionately on those who look “too confident for their 
own good” or who had their “head up, back straight, 
upper body moving too much”, or those who were 
“swaggering, looking hard” (Norris & Armstrong, 1999, 
p. 122). In our ethnographic account of the subjective 
experience of surveillance in a northern city in the UK, 
we showed how marginalised groups responded to 
CCTV monitoring by covering their faces with hats and 
scarves, flicking “V signs” at surveillance camera opera-
tors, and throwing bricks at cameras. Of course, those 
who obscure their faces with clothing or who oriented 
their behaviour to camera operators through confron-
tation and abusive gestures are often singled out for 
further attention by surveillance camera operators (see 
Norris, 2003, p. 265). In this context, the body becomes 
both a “performance” and a “straitjacket” (Shilling, 
2003) as the “bodily hexis” (dialect, accent, dress, body 
posture and demeanour) conveys resistant impressions 
that potentially leads to further surveillance and exclu-
sion (McCahill & Finn, 2014).  
7. Conclusion  
The surveillance studies literature has been dominated 
by Foucaultian and Deleuzian-inspired perspectives on 
“discipline” (Foucault, 1977) and “control” (Deleuze, 
1992). The aim of this paper has not been to “go be-
yond” Foucault or Deleuze. The work produced by 
these towering intellectuals is far too important for 
that and will no doubt continue to frame theoretical 
debates on surveillance for decades to come. Instead, 
our aims were much more modest and were simply to 
propose an alternative approach to the study of sur-
veillance that replaced a discursive analysis of historical 
texts with empirically-informed “field” theory. As 
Haggerty (2006, pp. 41-42) argues, while surveillance 
theorists might want to embrace many of Foucault’s 
insights, they may also want to reserve “space for 
modestly realist projects that analyze the politics of 
surveillance or the experiences of the subjects of sur-
veillance”. To do this, we argued, required a different 
approach to Foucault whose main concern was with 
the forms that power relations take and “the tech-
niques they depend upon, rather than upon the groups 
and individuals who dominate or are dominated as a 
consequence” (Luke, 2005, p. 89). As Foucault (2001, p. 
331) explained, “the main objective of…struggles is to 
attack not so much such-or-such institution of power, 
or group, or elite, or class but, rather, a technique, a 
form of power”. Thus, whereas Foucault begins with an 
“‘ascending analysis of power starting from its infinites-
imal mechanisms’, Bourdieu gives priority to a focused 
analysis of the nexus of institutions that ensures the 
reproduction of economic and cultural capital” in the 
wider field of power (Wacquant, 2005, p. 145).  
Drawing upon this approach, we argued that the 
demise of the Keynesian Welfare State (KWS) and the 
rise of neo-liberal economic policies in the UK has 
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placed new surveillance technologies at the centre of a 
reconfigured “crime control field” (Garland, 2001) de-
signed to control the problem populations created by 
neo-liberal economic policies (Wacquant, 2009a). At 
the same time, however, we suggested that field theo-
ry offers the potential to examine national variations in 
the up-take of new surveillance technologies by show-
ing how globalizing forces and wider social changes are 
filtered through the political and juridical fields of dif-
ferent national jurisdictions. This approach also pro-
vides a bridge between society-wide analysis and mi-
cro-sociology by showing how surveillance practice is 
filtered through the existing organisational, occupa-
tional and individual concerns of surveillance agents. 
Following this, we situated the introduction of new 
surveillance within “fields of struggle”, arguing that the 
distribution of various forms of “capital”—economic, 
social, cultural and symbolic—operate as a range of 
goods or resources that structure the dynamics of sur-
veillance practices and power relations in the crime 
control field. In this respect, our analysis involved a 
critical engagement with two theoretical tradi-
tions−Focaultian approaches which provide dystopian 
visions of the power of state surveillance while under-
playing agency, and interactionist perspectives on the 
“everyday politics of resistance” (Marx, 2002; J. C. 
Scott, 1990) which often fail to consider how “the in-
teraction itself owes its form to the objective struc-
tures which have produced the dispositions of the in-
teracting agents and which allot them their relative 
positions in the interaction and elsewhere” (Bourdieu, 
1977, p. 81).  
To sum up therefore we have attempted to com-
bine a macro-level analysis which explores how global-
izing forces are filtered through the “field of power” in 
different national jurisdictions, with a micro-level anal-
ysis which shows how new surveillance measures are 
mediated by the “habitus” of surveillance agents and 
surveillance subjects. This approach, we argue, ad-
vances our understanding of surveillance politics in two 
ways. First, it can “act as solvent of the new neoliberal 
common sense that ‘naturalizes’ the current state of 
affairs” (Wacquant, 2009b, p. 129) by demonstrating 
that there are alternatives to the “bad example” set by 
neo-liberal countries such as the UK where the “pro-
cesses of normalisation of surveillance have gone much 
further than elsewhere” (Murakami Wood & Webster, 
2009, p. 260). Second, it provides a corrective to “top-
down” surveillance theories which continue to portray 
surveillance subjects as “docile bodies”, rather than so-
cial actors who can contest power relations in a field 
that is very much skewed against them.  
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